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COMMENTS
defendant to withdraw the nolo plea. After sentence, it is the presence of
manifest injustice which will give the defendant the right to withdraw
(whether the injustice is present is also determined by the court). Also,
the court of its own volition, may, if it so pleases, set aside the plea of nolo
contendere.
THE CONSUMER-MANUFACTURER RELATIONSHIP
IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
THE PROBLEM
Due to the great strides made in merchandising processes and methods
of product distribution, there has developed almost indomitable impetus
toward protection of the ultimate consumer rather than toward restriction
of the manufacturer's liability as had been the tendency in the past. No
doubt the buying public relies quite heavily on the representations made
by suppliers of chattels in the various advertising media, and that warran-
ties and guaranties of merchantability serve as forceful motivations for the
consumer's purchasing habits. It is evident too, that under present market-
ing practices, most products or articles used by the public are purchased
from retailers; hence, today, the manufacturer and consumer have no
direct contractual relationship in most buying and selling transactions. In
view of these facts, the extent of the manufacturer's responsibility to ulti-
mate vendees who, not dealing directly with the producer, have relied on
representations and suffered injury due to imperfections in the products,
has been constantly changing. The past and present relationship between
the producer and buyer is the scope of this comment.
THE RULE AND ITS HISTORY
Initially, the common law remedy for misrepresentation was an action
on the case in the nature of deceit which was used almost entirely in direct
transactions between buyer and seller.1 However, in the early case of
Pasley v. Freeman2 the action of deceit was held valid for a false affirma-
tion made by the manufacturer even though the buyer had no direct deal-
ings with the seller. Consequently, deceit had become an established cause
of action regardless of contractual privity and it had become acceptable
for consumers who had been misled as to merchantability of products to
seek redress in an action of trespass on the case for breach of duty which
sounded in tort. In Stuart v. Wilkins3 the cause of action for misrepre-
sentation was taken out of tort and brought in assumpsit for breach of the
' Smith and Prosser, Torts, c. 18 (1952).
2 3 Term. Rep. 51 (1789).
3 1 Dougl. 19 (1778).
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vendor's warranty of the fitness of the product and, thus, for the first time
a court had established that the action had a contractual character. Grad-
ually, the tort action had fallen into disuse and habitual resort to the
contract remedy led to the misconceived insistence on privity of contract
as a condition of relief, especially because under assumpsit the common
count for money received would be pleaded so that the plaintiff could
recover his consideration paid. 4 With the continuous infrequent use of the
tort remedy, many courts believed that such remedy had been eliminated
whereas, in fact, the idea that the term "warranty" implied a contractual
relationship was without historical foundation and cannot logically justify
the notion that warranty actions are ex contractu. Hence, presently, al-
though warranty actions are considered almost exclusively as contract
actions, there is no good reason why the tort action should not co-exist
with it since, in reality, the breach of warranty action is a hybrid. It starts
out contractually but it really emanates from a failure to carry out a
particular representation and thus results in tort where the seller has vio-
lated his obligation and misrepresented his goods."
Notwithstanding this historical error, the requirement of contractual
privity in warranty cases was formally adopted as a rule in Winterbottom
v. Wright6 where the court held that when the purchaser of a motor
coach was injured as a result of defects in the construction of the coach,
he could not recover from the manufacturer because of lack of privity
between the parties. Since that time, privity of contract had become the
sine qua non of an action for breach of warranty and the holding in the
Winterbottom case became fixed as the unwavering rule in subsequent
cases. 7 The courts justified the necessity of privity by reasoning found in
Davidson v. Nichols where the court asserted:
Whenever a wrong or injury results from the breach of a contract, merely,
an action for redress, whether in form ex contractu or ex delicto, can be main-
tained only by a party to the contract. The obligation and duty arising out of
a contract are due only to those with whom it is made. If the rule were
otherwise and no privity of contract were required to sustain an action for a
breach, there would be no limit to the liability which might be incurred by a
contracting party. It would extend so as to give a right of action to all persons,
however remote from any connection with the original parties to a contract,
4 Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1888).
5 Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 177 N.Y.S. 2d 7 (1958). Note in 42 Harv.
L. Rev. 416 (1928) comments: "Thus, the statement that a warranty is necessarily a
contractual obligation accurately describes neither its nature nor its extent. It defines
at most an arbitrary limitation which has been imposed by some courts in cases relating
to sales and resting not upon necessities of logic but upon a conception of policy."
6 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
7 Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255, 44 N.E. 457 (1896); Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa.
70, 21 At. 244 (1891); Carter v. Harden, 78 Me. 528, 7 Atl. 392 (1886).
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or however numerous they might be, who happened to sustain a loss or suffer
an injury attributable to a breach of the stipulations into which a contracting
party had entered.8
THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF PRIVITY-IN TORT
In spite of the overwhelming acceptance of the rule and of the fact that
the prevailing rule today still requires privity of contract for an action
based on breach of warranty 9 the rule has been modified and dotted with
refinements and exceptions by some courts which have indulged in various
fictions on which to base the manufacturer's liability.10 The exceptions
which had arisen were based both on negligence in tort and on privity in
contract.
In allowing recovery on the grounds of tort, one court declared that if
the seller knew the chattel was inherently dangerous for its intended use
and failed to disclose such facts to the buyer, the seller became liable to
anyone who might be injured by such use since the injury was to have
been reasonably anticipated."
In Bright v. Barnett12 the court found liability against the manufacturer
where the chattel was furnished for use on the defendant's premises, thus
treating the buyer and user as an invitee for business.
Perhaps the most important exception has stemmed from the case of
Thomas v. Winchester a where the seller was held liable to a third party
for negligence in the preparation of an article dangerous to the life, health
and general safety of the public. The courts were in considrable disagree-
ment as to what was to be included in the somewhat vague concept of
"inherently dangerous articles" but did not hesitate to extend exceptional
recovery to the consumer and fix liability on producers of foodstuffs,
medicines and firearms. 14 To add to the turmoil, the courts which allowed
recovery on the theory of negligence were not in agreement as to the
proof required by the injured party to establish his cause of action. Some
courts said that the plaintiff had to prove actual negligence or a lack of
due care on the part of the manufacturer, and that the mere showing of
injury was not enough.1 Many courts, however, felt that in cases of sale
8 11 Allen (Mass.) 514, 517 (1866). The court indicated that those who did not con-
tract with the manufacturer were merely strangers in whose behalf the law did not
foster any public duty on the part of the producer.
9 77 C.J.S., Sales § 305 (1952).
10 Ibid., at 1125 et seq. listing states which have abandoned the privity requirement:
Calif., Fla., Ill., Iowa, Kan., La., Mich., Miss., Ohio, Okla., Pa., Tenn., Tex., and Wash.
11 Langridge v. Levy, 4 M. & W. 337 (1837).
1288 Wis. 299, 60 N.W. 418 (1894). 136 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
14 Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J. 748, 70 Atl. 314 (1908).
15 Melick, The Sale of Food & Drink at 275 n. 16 (1936).
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of food for human consumption, proof of negligence was not required
and the theory of res ipsa loquitor was used to establish a prima facie case
against the producer.'
Thus, the courts had met with great difficulty in applying the formal-
ism of a rule which had been adopted in a prior century and which could
not be justifiably geared to the complexities of an advanced age. As a
consequence, in an effort to make the jurisprudence conform to the exist-
ing economic and social changes of the times, the courts have struggled
with the rule in an endeavor to ward off the obvious inapplicability of
an outmoded theory. Finally, in 1916, the modern doctrine as to the lia-
bility of a manufacturer was first voiced in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. by Justice Cardozo. In that case, the auto manufacturer sold an
automobile to a retail dealer who in turn resold the car to the plaintiff.
While driving the auto, plaintiff was injured when it had suddenly col-
lapsed due to defects in the structure of one of the wheels. The manu-
facturer sought to absolve himself from liability since he had not dealt
with the ultimate vendee but, in deciding the case for the plaintiff, the
court stated:
We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to
poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, to things which in their normal
operation are implements of destruction. If the nature of a thing is such that
it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made,
it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to
be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the
thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new
tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger
is under a duty to make it carefully.... Beyond all question, the nature of an
automobile gives warning of probable danger if its construction is defective.18
The reasoning of the court was that the manufacturer by placing the car
upon the open market assumed a responsibility to the consumer resting,
not upon the contract, but upon the relation arising from his purchase
and the foreseeability of harm if proper care were not used. 19
Although the MacPherson case did not extend relief beyond the ulti-
mate purchaser, later cases did stretch the cause of action to the pur-
chaser's employees or to members of his family.20 In McLeod v. Linde
Air Products Co., 21 the court went so far as to make the seller liable to
anyone who may reasonably have been expected to be in the vicinity of
1' Campbell Soup Co. v. Davis, 163 Va. 89, 175 SE. 743 (1934).
17217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
18 Ibid., at 389, 1053.
19 Authority cited note 17, supra.
20 Crane Co. v. Sears, 16 Okla. 603, 35 P.2d 916 (1934).
21318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W. 2d 122 (1927).
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the chattel when applied to its intended use and to be endangered if it
turned out to be defective.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVITY RULE-IN CONTRACT
Once the liability of the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer had
been established on the basis of negligence, an attempt was made to find
some basis on which to hold the manufacturer strictly liable making him
in effect, a guarantor of his product, regardless of the amount of care he
exercised. Hence, the best way to accomplish this was to extend the lia-
bility of implied warranty to the ultimate consumer.22 An impediment to
the extension of this liability, however, was the unfounded theory ex-
pounded in the Stuart case treating "warranty" as contractual in nature
requiring contractual privity which did not, in fact, exist. The courts,
however, soon began to display ingenuity in evolving theories in order to
avoid the objection of lack of privity.
The first exception which some courts employed was in cases dealing
with goods designed for human consumption.23 Those courts maintained
that the requirement of privity of contract was not controlling and that
the warranty of wholesomeness and fitness of food attaches to and runs
with the goods much the same as warranties in realty transactions. In
Wiedeman v. Keller the Supreme Court of Illinois in justifying such ex-
ception remarked:
In an ordinary sale of goods, the rule of caveat emptor applies, unless the
purchaser exacts of the vendor a warranty. Where, however, articles of food
are purchased from a retail dealer for immediate consumption, the conse-
quences resulting from the purchase of an unsound article may be so serious,
and may prove so disastrous to the health and life of the consumer, that public
safety demands that there should be an implied warranty on the part of the
vendor that the article sold is sound, and fit for the use for which it was
purchased. It may be said that the rule is a harsh one, but, as a general rule,
in the sale of provisions the vendor has so many more facilities for ascertaining
the soundness or unsoundness of the article offered for sale, which are not
possessed by the purchaser, that it is much safer to hold the vendor liable than
it would be to compel the purchaser to assume the risk.24
In support of this theory, some writers place liability on the manu-
facturer based on a feeling that social policy demands that the burdens of
accidental injuries caused by defective chattels can best be assumed by
the manufacturer through insurance or pricing methods.
25
22 Authority cited note 9, supra.
23 Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W. 2d
445 (1936); Rainwater v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 315, 95 So. 444
(1923); Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Ad. 931 (1915); Parks v. G. C. Yost Pie
Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914).
24 171111. 93, 99, 49 N.E. 210, 211 (1897). 25 Prosser, Torts, at 673 (1941).
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Subsequently, in Baxter v. Ford Motor Company,26 the exception to
the requirement of contractual privity was extended to products other
than those for human consumption. In that case, a pebble thrown by the
tire of a passing car had shattered the windshield of plaintiff's automobile
causing severe injuries to his eye. Despite the lack of privity, the court
allowed relief based on representations of the manufacturer that the car's
windshield was made of non-shatterable glass. The court said: "[T]he
original act of delivering an article is wrong, when, because of the lack of
those qualities which the manufacturer represented it as having, the ab-
sence of which could not be readily detected by the consumer, the article
is not safe for the purposes for which the consumer would ordinarily use
it.,,27
A second method employed by the courts to fix liability on the pro-
ducer was to find a unilaterial contract between the manufacturer and
the ultimate consumer .2 If the manufacturer made representations in an
advertisement in such a way as to induce a vendee to rely on them, the
manufacturer was held directly liable to the vendee upon a unilateral con-
tract which was created, according to the court, by the vendee's accept-
ance of the claims of the advertisement.
One theory which some courts used to circumvent the need of privity
was the "agency doctrine." In Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores29 the
plaintiff was injured by a pin which was concealed in a loaf of bread
purchased by his wife. The court allowed recovery to the plaintiff hus-
band on the basis that the wife acted as his agent in making the purchase
and that the only contract which existed was actually between the plain-
tiff and the defendant baker.30
In Bowman v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,3 1 the judge re-
fused to extend this theory of agency but did allow the injured party to
recover on still another premise; yiz., the "household-fund theory." In
that case, the defendant had sold a bottle of contaminated salad oil to the
sister of the plaintiff. When eating the salad oil, the plaintiff became vio-
lently ill and attempted to recover on the basis that the sister acted as her
agent in the purchase. The court did not acknowledge this but allowed
recovery maintaining that since the plaintiff and the purchaser lived to-
gether, the money used for the purchase had come from a joint expense
26 168 Wash. 456, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932).
27 Ibid., at 466.
28 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q.B. 256 (1893).
29255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
3 0 Accord: Mouren v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 139 N.Y.S. 2d 375
(1955).
31 284 App. Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S. 2d 904 (1954).
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fund and had been purchased for joint consumption. In denouncing the
agency theory, the court explained:
I think the Ryan case did not extend the agency rule beyond the case of a
wife purchasing for her husband .... In 1943, long after the decision in the
Ryan case, the Law Revision Commission after an exhaustive study, recognized
the extreme limitations of the privity rule, and recommended to the Legisla-
ture an amendment.., which would have given a right of action to the buyer's
employees and to the members of his household. This the Legislature refused
to do... I think this court should not, through a theory of agency, go beyond
that which was permitted in the Ryan case, namely, the wife acting as agent
for the husband.3 2
Some jurisdictions in seeking to make the producer of chattels guaran-
tee the fitness of his products believed the best way to place liability on
him was on grounds imposed by law as a principle of public policy to
protect human health and life.33 In Ketterer v. Armour & Co. 34 the court
believed that remedies to an injured consumer should not be based on the
intricacies of the law of sales but should rest "upon the demands of social
justice." In abolishing the privity requirement, the court vaguely con-
cluded in Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
[I]f privity of contract is required, then, under the situation and circum-
stances of modern merchandising in such matters, privity of contract exists in
the consciousness and understanding of all right-thinking persons.35
One court has gone even farther and engaged in a discussion about the
"sacredness of human life" in allowing a consumer recovery.36
Perhaps the most frequently used means to avoid the privity barrier
and, perhaps, the most acceptable theory adopted by the courts is the
"third party beneficiary doctrine."3 7 In those cases, the retailer who is in
effect a distributing medium for articles manufactured by the producer,
enters into a contract for the benefit of the public who is the beneficiary.
Thus, the contractual relation of the producer and retailer is engaged in
for the benefit of a third party-the ultimate consumer. The most recent
court to adopt this exception was one in New York in Parish v. Great
Alantic & Pacific Tea Co. where the court in abolishing the old rule
reasoned:
32 Ibid., at 907, 908.
33 Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942).
34 200 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y., 1912).
35230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W. 2d 445, 450 (1936).
36 Davis v. Van Camp, 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920).
37 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co. Ltd., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799 (1939); Dryden v.
Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33,77 P. 2d 833 (1938); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino,
27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928); Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W.
48 (1937.
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We must correct errors in the law and we must make those recognized and
accepted changes with the times which are substantiated by reason and experi-
ence. Reason outranks technicality. Public welfare and human rights are far
more important than a tenacious adherence to unsound decisions of the past,
especially when outmoded or where reasons for their existence are nonexistent
today.38
CONCLUSION
Thus, in recent years, significant changes have developed in the negli-
gence and warranty cases which have greatly expanded the range of
manufacturer's liability as had been manifested by earlier authorities. In
fact, the expansion has grown to the point where the courts are at almost
hopeless variance as to the present rule in such cases. What is more alarm-
ing is that this disagreement will continue and expand to new heights as
new occasions arise which make it fitting "to discard legal concepts of the
past to meet new conditions and practices of our changing and progressing
civilization. ' 39
However, iwspite of the diversity of reasoning employed by the courts
in establishing the rights and duties between manufacturers and con-
sumers, it is safe to assert that almost anyone can recover from the manu-
facturer of a defective or deleterious article which has been put out in
the legitimate channels of trade regardless of the "due care" or "privity"
requirements. In the final analysis, any outmoded fictions formerly em-
ployed by manufacturers to seek relief from their responsibility to the
buying public cannot be asserted in view of the recent findings of the
courts which have attempted to keep abreast with our ever-changing ways
of life.
38 177 N.Y.S. 2d 7 (1958).
39 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612, 615 (1958).
WIRE TAPPING-A DEFINITION OF "INTERCEPTION," "DI-
VULGENCE," "USE," "CONSENT OF THE SENDER," AND
"PERSONS PROHIBITED" SINCE THE NARDONE CASE
Congress had enacted what appeared to be a very comprehensive piece
of legislation to prohibit the interception of wire communications and
their divulgence if either is not authorized by the sender and to prohibit
the derivative use of such intercepted communications if that is also not
authorized by the sender. A pertinent part of this enactment reads as
follows:
[No] person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communi-
cation and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person .. .and no per-
son having received such intercepted communication or having become ac-
quainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same,
